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Montague Semantics — General Introduction 
 
According to the classical Montagovian theory, meaning of a 
sentence is given by its truth conditions, i.e. to know the meaning of a 
sentence amounts to knowing what the world should be like for a given 
sentence to be true. Montague semantics is an approach to the natural 
language that attempts to provide a very precise, explicit and formal 
account of the notion of meaning (understood in the previously described 
way). Montague believed that a formal theory of natural language can be 
developed, despite the fact that natural languages (as it had earlier been 
stressed by Tarski) have no specified structure, are semantically closed1, 
contain indexicals, etc.   
In the paragraphs that follow, I will quickly overview Montague’s 
approach to the semantics of ordinary language to make easier the 
understanding of the difficulties it encounters and the later developments 
and extensions of the theory that are supposed to deal with such 
difficulties.  
Montagovian theory attempts to provide an account of the relation 
between the world and natural language in a very precise and formal 
                                                          
1 Languages without specified structure do not contain an unambiguous characterization 
of those expressions that are to be considered meaningful; a semantically closed language 
is the one which contains not only propositions, but the names of the propositions and 
expressions that can be used to refer to the propositions in the language; indexicals are 
those expressions that are highly dependant on the context, e.g. I, here, now.  
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manner. In doing so Montague is utilizing the means of model theory. In 
other words, he defines a set of objects (“the universe”), interprets 
linguistic expressions as elements of this set and describes relations among 
them employing set theory, first order logic, modal logic and intensional 
logic [Dowty et al. 1981, 10]. 
I will explain in more details how Montague’s approach is supposed 
to work by presenting his account of the semantic value of names first, 
since it seems that in the case of names the aforementioned relation 
between the world and our language seems to be quite straight-forward. In 
Montague’s semantics a name, for instance “Plato” stands for an object, an 
individual — Plato. Similarly, the semantic value of a predicate e.g. “talks” 
is given by a set of individuals who talk, or, more precisely, by a 
characteristic function2 that takes an individual (Plato)3 and yields the 
result true if the individual actually talks (belongs to the set of objects that 
talk) and returns the value false if that is not the case. Finally, semantic 
value of the sentence “Plato talks” is either truth or falsity  (Dowty et al 
1981, 5). 
This is a view that was first put forward by Frege. Another principle 
derived from Frege’s philosophy of language and closely related to the 
semantic value of complex expressions is compositionality. According to 
the compositionality principle, semantic value of complex expressions can 
be derived based on the formal and syntactic combinations of the basic 
linguistic units. Compositionality is one of the basic presuppositions of 
Montague’s theory. It is supposed to explain the productivity and creativity 
of our language competence — the fact that humans are even though finite 
beings capable of producing and understanding potentially infinite number 
of language expressions.  
Besides compositionality, Frege’s theory provides motivation for 
including another framework into Montague’s theory — the framework of 
                                                          
2 Characteristic function takes individuals as arguments and yields either one or zero 
(true or false) as their value. Taking characteristic functions rather than sets of individuals 
that the predicate applies to as the meaning of the predicate makes the computation 
somewhat easier.  
3 This is a simplified view, though. In actual Montague’s semantics a noun phrase is 
thought to denote a set of properties; consult footnote 6. 
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possible worlds. Frege noticed that there is a difference in cognitive value 
between the statements of identity such as “Socrates is Socrates” and 
“Socrates is the teacher of Plato”. This fact is hard to explain in the 
referential framework because both sentences are supposed to state self-
identity of the same object. Frege’s two-dimensional semantics — the 
statement that meaning of words is consisted of their sense and reference 
and that the aforementioned expressions share their reference, but differ 
in sense — was supposed to explain away this problem. Nevertheless, 
Frege provided only a metaphorical definition of sense; he claimed that 
sense is just a “mode of representation of a referent” [Frege 2001, 7–10]. 
Montague tried to provide a formal account of this notion by employing the 
framework of possible worlds. Intension of a proper name in his 
framework then is a constant function which picks out its bearer in every 
possible world. Intension of a definite description is a function from sets of 
properties within possible worlds and moments of time to truth values. 
Such approach makes us able to at the same time stay within the truth-
conditional/referential framework, but also to capture our intuition that 
the aforementioned propositions actually differ in cognitive value.  
 
Problems for Montague semantics — (cross-sentential anaphora and 
epistemic modals) 
 
In Montague’s theory semantic value of a sentence is given by the 
set of assignments, i.e. it is a function from possible worlds and moments of 
time to truth values. Because of this property, Montague’s framework is 
only capable of treating sentences in isolation. Consequently, it faces 
difficulties in treating certain phenomena that require taking entities that 
are larger than sentences as minimal semantic units.  
The first example of a phenomenon that cannot be adequately 
accommodated within Montague’s framework is the cross-sentential 
anaphora. Cross-sentential anaphoric pronouns cannot be understood 
either as referring expressions that inherit their referents from other 
referring expressions, or as variables bound by the quantified antecedents 
in Montague’s semantics. 
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Example of a cross-sentential anaphora: A man comes in. He sees a dog.  
 
The obvious translation of this sentence in the Montagovian framework 
would be the following one4: 
 
∃x (man(x) ∧ comes-in(x)) ∧ ∃y (dog(y) ∧ sees(x, y))  
 
But, this translation is not correct since the second variable x is not 
bound by the first existential quantifier. Since quantifiers function only 
as intra-sentential operators within this framework the fact that the 
pronoun “he” refers to the same man mentioned in the first sentence 
cannot be captured.  
More informally, this is due to the fact that propositions are 
functions that map possible worlds to truth values in Montague’s 
semantics. Classical framework does not provide us with any means to 
connect two of such functions in the way that is needed to account for 
the relation between anaphoric pronoun and its antecedent.  
The correct translation of the sentence “A man comes in. He sees 
a dog” would be something like:  
 
∃x (man(x) ∧comes-in(x) ∧ ∃y (dog(y) ∧ sees(x, y))). 
 
The problem with this translation is in the fact that it cannot be 
produced in a compositional manner from the formalization of “A man 
comes in”, that is — ∃x (man(x) ∧ comes-in(x)). 
 
Example of a donkey sentence:  
 
Another example of a failure to capture the intended meaning of 
a sentence within the classical framework is by Peter Geach [Geach 
1962]. That is the example of the so-called donkey-sentences that have 
the following form: 
                                                          
4 Typed lambda calculus that is being used in Montague’s semantics will be substituted by 
the first order logic for the sake of clarity 
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If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. 
 
Just like in the previous case, an intuitive translation of this sentence 
would be:  
 
∃x (farmer(x) ∧ ∃y (donkey(y) ∧ owns(x, y))) → beats(x, y) 
 
But, again, just like in the previous case — the two variables in the 
consequent are free.  
The correct translation would be something like: 
 
∀x (farmer(x) → ∀y ((donkey(y) ∧ owns(x, y)) → beats(x, y))) 
 
Again, just like in the case of cross-sentential anaphora this 
translation cannot be obtained compositionally from Geach’s donkey 
sentence. The problem here is that the pronoun “it” cannot be explained as 
a referring expression since no referring object, no particular donkey is 
mentioned in the sentence. Besides that, similarly to the previous example 
it cannot be understood as a variable bound by the antecedent existential 
quantifier since it is not under its scope — it is free. In addition, even if the 
quantifier “donkey”5 could do this, assuming that it is an existential 
quantifier, we still would not get the intuitive truth conditions which 
require that a farmer beats every donkey he owns.  
In conclusion, we cannot derive a translation of the donkey 
sentence into the language of predicate logic in a systematic way; in order 
to capture the intuitive meaning we have to assume that the indefinite 
expression buried in a subordinate position ends up having wide scope and 
universal force. A theory based on such assumptions might capture the 
facts, but it is clearly ad hoc, and can generate a host of false predictions, as 
well. 
                                                          
5 In Montague’s framework, noun phrases are treated as quantifiers; this approach allows 
for their uniform treatment; their denotation should be understood as a set of properties 
[Janssen 2012].  
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Epistemic modals example: 
 
Another problem for Montague’s semantics was presented by Seth 
Yalcin in 2007. Yalcin claims that epistemic modals (such as might), can 
sometimes give rise to something like Moore’s paradox. He presents two 
sentences: 
1) It might not be raining and it is raining.  
2) It is raining and it might not be raining.  
The first one sounds odd and almost contradictory, whereas the second 
one does not seem equally odd.  
The aforementioned sentences can be formalized in the following way: 
1) ◊˥P ˄ P 
2) P ˄ ◊˥P 
Bearing in mind the fact that in classical framework conjunction is 
commutative then these two sentences should have the same truth 
conditions. Truth-conditional semantics cannot account for this difference 
in the oddity of the two sentences then — it treats the two sentences in just 
the same way. They are both equally consistent in Montague’s grammar 
and classical modal logic and (given that conjunction is a commutative 
connective) there are no means to explain the fact that the order of 
conjuncts turns out to be relevant for our understanding of the sentences, 
ascription of truth value, consistency, etc.  
It has been widely agreed that this problem can be addressed by 
employing a different framework, i.e. dynamic semantics. It is a theory in 
which meanings are treated not as truth-conditions, but as context change 
potentials. What follows is a general overview of this approach. 
 
Dynamic Semantics — General Introduction 
 
The aforementioned problems led to the development of dynamic 
semantics in which meaning of a sentence is not given by its truth 
conditions, but rather, sentences are understood as instructions for 
changing any already existing context (understood as a set of possible 
worlds) [Groenendijk, Stokhof 1996, 106]. Meaning is given not as in the 
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case of the standard semantics of predicate logic as the interpretation of a 
formula (i.e. as a set of assignments, those assignments that verify the 
formula), but as a set of ordered pairs of assignments. Due to such 
understanding of semantic value existential quantifiers in dynamic 
framework have extendible scope and the compositional translation of the 
problematic sentences can be obtained.  
Existential quantifier 
 
Intuitively, an existential quantifier in dynamic semantics 
introduces a new variable and then eliminates all the possible worlds 
without that variable. More precisely, the dynamic interpretation of ∃xφ 
will consist of those pairs of assignments (g, h) such that there is some 
assignment k which diﬀers from g at most in x and which together with h 
forms a possible input-output pair for φ. The interpretation clause for 
existentially quantiﬁed formulas then reads as follows: [[∃xφ]] = {(g, 
h)|∃k:k[x]g & (k, h) ∈ [[φ]]} [Groendinijk 1991, 47].  
 
Conjunction 
 
Conjunction in the dynamic predicate logic passes on values of 
variables from the first conjunct to the second one. Its formal definition is 
as follows:  
[[φ∧ψ]] = {(g, h)|∃k: (g, k) ∈ [[φ]] & (k, h) ∈ [[ψ]]}  
According to this deﬁnition, the interpretation of φ∧ψ with input g 
may result in output h iﬀ there is some k such that interpreting φ in g may 
lead to k, and interpreting ψ in k enables us to reach h [Groendinijk 1991, 
45-48]. It clearly follows from such definition that the conjunction 
connective is not commutative.  
 
Modal operator 
 
Its role is to test possible worlds and if the set of possible worlds 
expressed by the proposition is consistent with the information state — its 
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output is the very same information state; if it is not consistent — it 
returns an empty set as an output [Veltman 1996, 231]. Formally: 
c[◊ϕ] = {w ∈ c |c [ϕ] ≠ Ø}6 
 
How dynamic semantics accounts for problematic anaphora 
 
When the first sentence, “A man came in”, is accepted by the hearer, 
what happens is that a new variable is added to the domain of the 
assignments in the hearer’s information state, a certain object is assigned 
to that variable and then the information state is reduced to those 
assignments in which that object is in the extension of “came in”. The 
second sentence reduces the information state to those assignments in 
which the object assigned to the new variable is in the extension of “he sees 
a dog”.  
Resolution of donkey sentences is quite similar; implication is also 
understood as a dynamic connective — the one that passes on values from 
the antecedent to the consequent. Universal force of the existential 
quantifier is achieved by requiring that for every pair of assignments <h, g> 
in the interpretation of the antecedent there is some assignment k such 
that <h, k> is in the interpretation of the consequent [Groendinijk 1991, 
45–48]. 
 
How dynamic semantics accounts for epistemic modals 
 
Once again, the problem is that sentences “It is raining and it might 
not rain” are not inconsistent in classical logic and semantics since rain in 
the actual world is not precluded by there being no rain in some merely 
possible world. But, the problem is that they intuitively seem inconsistent. 
In the context of dynamic semantics, we can account for this intuition as 
follows:     
Agent’s knowledge is a set of finitely many sentences (A), and information 
state is a subset of such set (δ); a priori possibilities are represented as a 
                                                          
6 C denotes a context (information state) and w a possible world.  
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power set of the set A. Updating such information state means eliminating 
certain possible worlds/possibilities [Veltman 1996, 229].  
 Furthermore, the corresponding update action of the modal 
operator on the current context is to check whether an update with φ in 
the context yields a non-empty set of possibilities. In the affirmative case, 
the update with ◊φ returns the whole context otherwise it returns the 
empty set. The idea behind the analysis of might is the following one — one 
has to agree with “might P” if P is consistent with one’s knowledge.  
How does this account of modal operators and consistency help us 
to capture and explain the fact that “It is not raining and it might not be 
raining” seems inconsistent?  The idea is that “It might not be raining” will 
be consistent with the information state only if there are some non-raining 
worlds in the information state. But it is not consistent since in the 
previous step — while stating “It is raining” — I have already eliminated all 
of the non-rain worlds. Simply, when I assert “It is raining”, the information 
state is updated with the proposition that it is raining. That means that all 
worlds without rain are removed from the information state — that is — 
after eliminating the ¬p-worlds (by asserting “p”) the ◊¬p test will fail. This 
pair of sentences is inconsistent: it turns any state into ∅; it crashes the 
context. Naturally, once the context comes to accept p — it will fail the test 
corresponding to ◊¬p. 
 
Further problem — Gauker’s criticism 
 
To sum up — there is a kind of inconsistency of the sentences of the 
form: (p, ◊¬p); this inconsistency depends on the order of the appearance 
of the sentences in a discourse (since the sentence of the form: (◊¬p, p) is 
supposed to be consistent). Such phenomenon cannot be captured by the 
classical logic and formal semantics, but it can, according to Veltman’s 
opinion, be captured within the framework of dynamic semantics.   
On the other hand, according to Gauker’s criticism there might be 
something inconsistent about the second sequence as well 〈◊¬P, P〉. 
Gauker illustrates this difficulty in the following way: “As I walk out of my 
house, I say “It’s going to rain”. But then as I step outside I look up at the 
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sky and say, “It might not rain”. It does seem as though, in saying “It might 
not rain”, I have taken back what I first said, namely, “It will rain”.  So there 
is a kind of inconsistency in “It will rain” followed by “It might not rain”. 
But likewise: Suppose as I leave the house, I grab an umbrella, saying to my 
wife, “It might rain”. But then, as I leave the house, I look up at the sky and 
say, “Nah, it won’t rain” and toss the umbrella back inside. Again, my 
second sentence amounts to taking back what I first said” [Gauker 2007, 
10]7. 
Why is that a problem for the dynamic semantics?  
As I have previously said — modal operators in the dynamic 
semantics function as tests that are supposed to check if the proposition at 
question is consistent with the given information state and yield either the 
same information state if the proposition is consistent with it or an empty 
set if it is not. Hence, ◊¬P simply checks if there are any non-raining 
possible worlds consistent with the information state and it yields the very 
same information state, but it does not eliminate all raining worlds from 
the information state, i.e. there are some possible worlds left that are not 
ruled out by the first conjunct and, consequently, the second sentence is 
predicted to be consistent in the dynamic semantics framework.  
In other words, even if it is compatible with the information state 
that there might be some (at least one) non-raining worlds, it does not 
mean that the raining worlds have been ruled out [Willer 2013, 10–11].  
There is another independent result that can motivate searching for 
a more adequate account for the semantic of epistemic modals except 
accounting for the intuition that the conjunction “It might not rain and it is 
raining” seems odd similarly to its reverse form (nevertheless to a smaller 
degree). That is the result presented by Egan who claims that usually 
transition from ◊˥p to p requires non-monotonic information growth [Egan 
2007]. This result is not incorporated in the dynamic semantic framework 
— no such information growth is required. Modal operator just checks if 
the given proposition is consistent with the information state and if it is — 
                                                          
7 Paradoxical character of the second sentence has been noticed by other authors as well 
[Willer 2013, 20; Sorensen 2009; Dorr and Hawthorne 2012].  
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it just returns the very same information state. Then the second sentence 
updates the starting information state. Hence, the sentence that involves 
“might” does not contribute anything to our knowledge. An example 
presented by Goodman and Lassiter might make this point clearer. Imagine 
the following discussion: 
 
A: What will happen in the game tonight between team X and team Y?  
B: Team X is likely to win. 
 
As Lassiter notices it is quite easy to see that “likely” in this case 
does convey some information about the world, but it is quite hard to 
create a model that will devise this seemingly banal fact [Goodman, 
Lassiter, manuscript].  
Hence, the case of non-monotonic information growth (in the case 
of ◊¬P and P sentence) might just reflect this general worry about the lack 
of informational content carried by epistemic modals as defined in the 
dynamic semantics framework.  
 
Possible solution — Probabilistic approach to epistemic modals in 
dynamic semantics? 
 
In the final part I will try to show that endorsing probabilistic 
approach to dynamic semantics can help us to rule out the aforementioned 
problems and attain a more comprehensive and accurate theory about the 
semantics of epistemic modals.  
In a probabilistic semantics — truth conditions are exchanged for 
probability conditions; more precisely — information states are 
interpreted as probability distributions over propositions [Van Eijck, 
Lappin 2014]. 
Formally — it can be a function from possible worlds (sets of 
assignments) to the information states to set of real numbers: I → K → [0, 
1], where I is the set of intensions, K is the set of knowledge 
representations, and [0, 1] is the set of reals p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. 
In that case then a probabilistic model M is a tuple (D, W, P) with D 
a domain, W a set of worlds for that domain (predicate 
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interpretations/assignments in that domain), and P a probability function 
P over W, i.e., for all w ∈ W, p(w) ∈ [0, 1]. 
In a dynamic framework that employs a model that involves this 
probability distribution — a meaning of a sentence could be represented as 
a change it introduces in the probability distribution of an information 
state. In other words — meanings would be defined as relations between 
probability distributions of the information states.  
 
Definition of a modal operator in a probabilistic dynamic semantics 
framework: 
 
As I have said in dynamic semantics — modal operator “might” 
would take a sentence — check if there are possible worlds consistent with 
the given information state and yield either the very same information 
state in the case of affirmative answer or an empty set.  
If we include probability distribution in our model, we are equipped 
to claim that epistemic modals operate on the sets of probabilities; it is not 
the case that they either return the whole information state or an empty 
state –they can also affect the probability distribution in the model.  
This leads to a new viewpoint on the way contexts are updated in 
general: it is not the case that the contexts are updated only by eliminating 
possibilities, they are also updated by shifting the admissible probabilities 
over the possibilities. As Seth Yalcin puts it — the conception of 
information this picture recommends is not as radical as it may appear. He 
claims that in the standard information theory the amount of information a 
signal carries is not just a function of the possibilities it eliminates; rather 
— it is also a function of how it shifts the probabilities over the open 
possibilities. Hence, it can be claimed that information is a fundamentally 
probabilistic notion [Yalcin 2012, 20].  
Analogously to updating information states by eliminating possible 
worlds — employing might operator decreases probability of accepting the 
opposite proposition. Then — when I say it might rain — it does not just 
detect the existence of such possibilities and then returns the context 
intact, but also it reduces the probability of accepting the sentences that 
involve reference to the non-raining worlds.  
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Update Mechanism — Bayes Rule 
 
The way contexts are updated in the probabilistic dynamic 
semantics can be described using means of the mathematical probability 
theory, i.e. transition from prior to posterior probabilities can be regulated 
using means of classical probability calculus (applying the Bayesian rule)8. 
Using this framework, we can capture the fact that both sentences sound 
odd (the fact that could not be explained in non-probabilistic dynamic 
semantics). Moreover, the difference in the degree of their oddity can be 
captured by the degree of the change that is produced in the probability 
distribution. Finally, the fact that ◊˥p and p requires non-monotonic 
information growth can be captured, again, by the change in the 
probability distribution that is produced.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Dynamic framework without the involvement of probabilities is 
advantageous for analyzing epistemic modals because it can explain the 
fact that the order of conjuncts in the sentences  
“It might be raining and it is not raining” versus “It is raining and it 
might not be raining” matters. Nevertheless, it turned out to be 
unsuccessful in terms of accommodating our intuition that both sentences 
sound odd — even though they differ in the degree of their oddity as well 
as the fact that transition from ◊˥p to p intuitively requires non-monotonic 
information growth. Dynamic semantics cannot accommodate this finding 
since epistemic modals function as operators on information states that 
take an information state and either returns all of it or none, depending 
whether the condition is satisfied. If epistemic modals are understood as 
operators on the probability distributions over information states, then the 
                                                          
8 Even though some problems with regard to the use of the Bayesian rule as a general 
mechanism for the belief updating have been noticed [Baltag, Smets 2008, 182], it seems 
that in this very limited framework that focuses only on the epistemic modals Bayesian 
rule might be a sufficient tool.  
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aforementioned gradience in oddity and information growth (in the case 
◊˥p and p) can be captured.  
Besides providing a possibility to model a solution to the problem in 
the treatment of the epistemic modals in the dynamic semantics 
framework denoted by Gauker, probabilistic approach has been proven to 
be successful in ruling out certain invalid patterns of reasoning that could 
be validated in an earlier framework that was supposed to account for the 
semantics of epistemic modals9 [Holliday, Icard 2013] as well as in 
modeling higher order beliefs in the epistemic and dynamic epistemic logic 
[Smets, Baltag 2008].  
It seems that even though it might seem unusual as a proposal for a 
basis for formal semantics — we might refer to the famous Kratzer’s claim: 
“Our semantic knowledge alone does not give us the precise quantitative 
notions of probability and desirability that mathematicians and scientists 
work with” [Kratzer 2012, 25], mathematical theory of probability can be 
employed to resolve certain issues within semantics and philosophy of 
language. It seems that this can also be a sufficient motivation for putting 
more effort in merging traditional ideas of belief revisions and more 
quantitative/probabilistic ones. Even though it is unclear at the moment 
how this general probabilistic semantics should work, there have been 
some tentative proposals — mainly by Goodman, Lassiter and Lappin. 
Finally, an advantage of such approach, besides capturing the 
pervasiveness of the uncertainty in natural language is that it is a 
promising theory that can bridge a gap between the formal theory of 
natural language and natural language processing and it can help in 
explaining the process of semantic learning.  
 
  
                                                          
9 The earlier framework I have in mind is Kratzer’s semantics for might [Yalcin 2010]; also 
it is noteworthy that the authors who propose the solution based on probabilities have in 
mind qualitative and not quantitative probabilities.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH TO EPISTEMIC MODALS IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF DYNAMIC SEMANTICS 
 
In dynamic semantics meaning of a statement is not equated with its truth 
conditions but with its context change potential. It has also been claimed 
that dynamic framework can automatically account for certain paradoxes 
that involve epistemic modals, such as the following one: it seems odd and 
incoherent to claim: (1) “It is raining and it might not rain”, whereas 
claiming (2) “It might not rain and it is raining” does not seem equally odd 
(Yalcin, 2007). Nevertheless, it seems that it cannot capture the fact that 
statement (2) seems odd as well, even though not as odd as the statement 
(1) (Gauker, 2007). I will argue that certain probabilistic extensions to the 
dynamic model can account for this subtlety of our linguistic intuitions and 
represent if not an improved than at least an alternative framework for 
capturing the way contexts are updated and beliefs revised with uncertain 
information.  
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